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THE MEAN 
K. L. Helstrom 
Considering the place of virtue in Aristotle's ethics, it 
is important both to clarify the notion of the mean and to 
determine how its connection to virtue adds clarification to 
the notion of virtue itself. There are two different inter-
pretations of the mean that might be drawn from Aristotle's 
writings. The first, though seeming to be the most natural, is 
an implausible interpretation and one to which Aristotle himself 
is not committed. The second, for the most part implicit in 
the discussion, escapes the most obvious difficulties that con-
front the first but leads to further difficulties. But if the 
notion of the mean remains somewhat obscure, then nothing has 
been gained by the definition of virtue in terms of the mean. 
Assuming that to aim toward the mean is characteristic of 
virtue, two distinct questions arise for any proposed inter-
pretation of the mean. First, for any virtuous action is it 
always true that it has the properties required by the inter-
pretation? Second, if we are perplexed about whether a certain 
action is virtuous or not, will the mean as so interpreted pro-
vide a criterion for resolving this perplexity? Any definition 
of virtue must give practical criteria for assessing particular 
actions or passions; it must be not only theoretically correct 
but also materially adequate. This point needs to be emphasized, 
since ethics is for Aristotle a practical science. To be able 
to aim at virtue, which is the essence of the moral life, requires 
that one be able to judge the virtue of alternative courses of 
action. Thus these two questions provide an adequate test for 
any interpretation of the mean. 
The first interpretation is that of the mathematical sense 
of mean, for which the differences between virtues and vices 
will be matters of degree. One characteristic of virtue that 
Aristotle cites is to be "destroyed by excess and defect and pre-
served by the mean" (N.E., 1104a25). This terminology of excess, 
defect, and mean naturally suggests this type of interpretation. 
Reinforcement is found in Aristotle's treatment of justice, 
particularly of corrective justice. At several points in the 
Politics and Nichomachean Ethics, he indicates a connection 
between justice and the mean,* so that one needs only to notice 
the mathematical model in terms of which justice is analyzed to 
derive a strong presumption for an analogous interpretation of 
the mean. 
Can a plausible case, which is consistent with the 
Nichomachean Ethics, be made for such an interpretation? That 
it cannot should be evident from seeking an answer to the second 
question above. Against the determination of the virtues by 
seeking some sort of mathematical mean, four, not necessarily 
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exhaustive, difficulties can be cited. 
First, since virtue, or the mean, is defined in some way 
as an average of excess and defect, it will be necessary to give 
some precise value to these terms. This must be done without 
knowing the mean of which they are excess or defect; otherwise 
the problem is already solved. But can this be done, and if so, 
how? Take as an example giving to charity. We might interpret 
the excess and defect as the absolute minimum and absolute 
maximum that one could possibly give, and calculate the average. 
But this average will, in most cases, itself be excessive, 
depending on the amount assigned as an absolute maximum. 
Alternatively, we might assign either "average" values of excess 
and defect or assign values that are the "greatest defect" and 
"least excess"; and than take the mean as the average of these 
values. But clearly these values are much more difficult to 
determine in concrete cases than the mean itself, unless the mean 
is already known. Either of these methods leads to the obvious 
difficulties that beset this interpretation. The confusion 
arises from attempting to derive a mean from the excess and 
defect when the most natural, and least obscure, course is to 
proceed in the opposite direction. The ideas of excess and defect 
can only be explicated in terms of a prior assessment of the 
proper amount, or mean, for any action. 
Second, any action at all might be virtuous as a mean for 
some arbitrarily chosen reference class. For any action, some 
feature which is susceptible of degree may be chosen for which 
that action lies in the mean, relative to that feature. Thus 
the action becomes a virtue in comparison to other actions 
sharing that feature. For example, apathy, as "moderation", would 
be justified as a mean between resistance to and active support 
of political and social institutions, such as segregation. 
Third, the preceding difficulty raises and depends upon 
another: the ambiguity of "degree" itself. Not only is the 
mean (in degree) as much in need of clarification as virtue, but 
actions may also admit of degree for each of their features and 
in various ways, such as in quantity, quality, frequency, etc. 
Take as an example, talking. Its excess may lie in talking too 
loudly, too frequently, at the wrong times, verbosely, indiscrimi-
nately, crudely, or in a way to incite, among others. This shows 
the difficulties inherent in basing virtue on degree. 
Fourth, is the idea of differences in degree (relative to 
ourselves) of actions and passions adequate to explain the 
differences between vices and virtues? Actions and passions are 
often judged in terms of their consequences and motives. And no 
action or passion could be excessive or deficient in degree 
which had no untoward motives or consequences. What constitutes 
overeating, for example, can only be determined insofar as it 
leads to obesity; and then only if it is the result of some 
improper motive and not of an organic condition. Otherwise, a 
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man of proper weight could be guilty of the simultaneous vices of 
overeating and overexercising. But it would not be clear how 
these excesses in degree could be assessed where there are no ill 
effects at all. Either may be the effect of the other, so that 
it is impossible to say which is the vice; given the excess of 
one, the other is a mean relatively in that it maintains the 
proper weight. In such cases, the determination of degree (of 
excess and defect) is derivative in the sense that it depends on 
a prior assessment of motives and consequences. We might want 
to say that their goodness or badness is also a matter of degree. 
But this does not appear to be true. Such motives and consequences 
differ not in degree but in kind; they are just the sort which are 
good or bad in themselves. Some things then are called excessive 
only if they are already known to be vices (have bad motives or 
consequences) and hence the definition of vice becomes a tautology. 
On the other hand, some actions and passions are thought to 
be virtuous or vicious regardless of their motives or consequences. 
What is taken as important is just the kind of action or passion 
that they are, e.g. murder or not lying. Thus they differ from 
their corresponding virtues or vices not in degree but in kind. 
Further, it is implausible to think of virtue as a deficiency 
carried to excess or as a deficiency of an excess. This also 
suggests qualitative rather than quantitative differences. How 
can the present interpretation of the mean handle these rather 
plausible claims? 
Some insight into these matters is gained by asking the 
other basic question: is the mean on this interpretation 
characteristic of all actions or passions presumed to be virtuous. 
Here we find an unexplained equivocation in Aristotle's moral 
system. He admits, but does not explicate a second model. 2 
Some actions, such as murder, are always vices and thus can 
never have a mean. Other actions, such as not lying supposedly, 
are always virtuous and thus can never have an extreme. There 
are then two classes of actions for Aristotle: those which 
become virtuous or vicious insofar as they do or do not lie in 
the mean, and those which are virtues or vices whether or not 
they are intermediate. For the second class, it is just not 
morally relevant that such actions are performed to a certain 
degree or that they have certain motives or consequences. The 
only thing of importance is the kind of action that they are. 
The question, which is not considered by Aristotle, arises 
of delimiting the range of application of these two models. 
There seems to be a natural solution. Non-moral terms which 
describe actions are capable of excess and defect, while terms 
with an explicit moral connotation signify either good or bad 
actions only and are not capable of such variation. We might 
then say that there is simply no problem with the latter, since 
we "know" already whether they are virtues or vices. Thus the 
three-part model (excessive-mean-defect) applies in the former 
case, for which there is a genuine problem; it is used to assess 
all non-moral terms signifying actions and passions. But two 
63 
points should be noted. First, in making such a bifurcation, 
it is necessary to know before-hand whether some actions are 
virtues or vices. Second, the use of the three-part model still 
needs to be justified even for the restricted class of terms. 
Accepting the above solution, some of the problems in 
using the mean in the mathematical sense to differentiate 
virtues and vices are surmounted. Since the mean only applies 
to the second class of actions, it is possible to admit con-
sistently that some virtues and vices do not differ in degree 
but in kind. But even within the second class, motives and 
consequences play a role in the moral assessment of some 
actions. Thus the mean (under this interpretation) is apparently 
not characteristic of all virtues within this class. Neither 
does it provide a criterion for determining those virtues. 
To feel pleasures or pains, etc. too much or too little 
is not well, "but to feel them at the right time, in reference 
to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right 
motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and 
best, and this is characteristic of virtue" (N.E., 1106b20-23). 
This is perhaps Aristotle's most explicit formulation of the 
mean and the source of its second interpretation. Here the 
mean is based upon certain features of the action or passion: 
time, objects, people affected, motive, and way performed. 
Let us call these the circumstances of the action. An action 
is intermediate if and only if each of its circumstances is 
proper. When the way an action is performed is significant and 
also a matter of degree, the first interpretation of the mean 
becomes a special case of the second. Further, for this 
interpretation, the excess and defect can be known only if the 
mean itself is known, since improper circumstances can be known 
only in reference to the proper circumstances of a particular 
action. The appeal of the first interpretation is that it 
creates the illusion that one can "calculate" the mean from the 
excess and defect. For example, the right time for an action is 
not determined by calculating an average of the different wrong 
times. Further, the capacity to formulate the maxim of that 
action depends in large measure on our knowing the proper times 
of its performance. And the time of performance can only be 
understood as improper insofar as it deviates from the norms 
used to determine the proper time. Indeed, norms of impropriety 
per se are inexplicable. 
Does this interpretation of the mean provide a criterion 
for determining the virtues? Through its greater flexibility 
in admitting factors other than degree, this interpretation 
escapes the four objections raised against the first interpreta-
tion. But a definition of virtue in its terms does not directly 
answer our question, but shifts its focus to the determination 
of the propriety of the circumstances. Is this a clarification? 
One reasonable and consistent way of reading the Nichomachean 
Ethics is that anyone with the proper experience anct moral 
education and with good practical judgment will just know 
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whether an action is virtuous. That is simply no problem. 
Otherwise, Aristotle would not have left the formulation of the 
mean so vague, if it were to be the primary guide to virtue. And 
in the Politics, he does say that "far better than such defini-
tions is their mode of speaking, who, like Gorgias, enumerate the 
virtues"(Politics, 1260a25-28). This reading resolves the 
present question, but several consequences follow. In particu-
lar, the definition of virtue as a mean is not a way of knowing 
what is virtuous but a property of virtues already known, and 
hence a principle of classification rather than of determination. 
Are all virtuous actions intermediate in this sense? As 
was pointed out above, the existence of two models for moral 
actions presents two kinds of problems. The first (that it 
would be necessary to know in advance whether some actions are 
virtues or vices in order to apply the models) is dispelled by 
the above reading of the text. This leaves as the crucial issue 
then the adoption of the three-part model for its appropriate 
class of actions. But there are two considerations weighing 
against the advisability of such an adoption. 
First, the range of application of Aristotle's two models, 
under this interpretation of the mean, needs to be questioned. 
One model applies to actions which are virtuous or vicious in 
all circumstances; the other applies to those actions, signified 
by non-moral terms, whose moral assessments depend on the 
circumstances of performance. But it is not clear that such a 
sharp demarcation between actions or terms can be made. Few 
actions are good or bad without qualifications; and the extent 
to which assessment of actions depends upon the "circumstances" 
forms a continuum from terms such as "talking" to those like 
"murder." Even for the latter, there are circumstances, e.g. 
"judicial murder", in which it might be taken as virtuous. 
Second, even within the range of application of the three-part 
model, there are apparent counter-examples. Take the case of 
imbibing. Abstinence might be a virtue, say for someone with an 
ulcer. But, otherwise, is drinking a little a vice? Further, 
there would be distinct vices, correlative to each virtue, for 
each way in which any of the circumstances might be improper. 
But apparently there is no such complexity. 
However, there is a plausible extension of this interpreta-
tion of the mean which is compatible with it and which meets 
these problems. This involves taking the mean as an application 
of categories to the practical subject matter. As pointed out, 
an action is intermediate if and only if each of its circum-
stances (time, objects, etc.) is proper. It is this list of 
circumstances which may be taken as a list of practical cate-
gories, so that a good must be good in each of them. Some 
justification of this may be sought in an analogy with the role 
of theoretical categories. 
In the theoretical sphere, categories provide the highest-
order predicates of theoretical judgments. As such, they also 
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indicate the different senses of "being", which is not a 
univocal concept. In a like manner, "good" is not a form which 
is "universally present in all cases and single", but has as 
many senses as "being" (N.E., 1096a23-28). Since "good" is 
the central practical concept, as "being" is the central 
theoretical concept, there is this much similarity. But for a 
complete analogy, practical categories would have to provide 
the highest-order predicates of practical judgments. If there 
are no practical categories or if they do not play such a role, 
we need to ask why, given Aristotle's approach, practical and 
theoretical judgments are so fundamentally dissimilar. 
Aristotle does not explicitly present the items in his 
characterization of the intermediate as a list of practical 
categories. The analogy above may not have occurred to him, 
however plausible it is. Or he may have felt that an exhaustive 
list of practical categories, unlike theoretical categories, 
could not be given. In any case, there is a need for them 
within the Aristotelian framework. The set of predicates per-
taining to a possible action forms its maxim. Some of these 
predicates will be relevant to the maxim being that of a 
virtuous action; that an action is in accordance with virtue 
must be based on its maxim, even if practical judgment is a 
function of virtue as it is for Aristotle. But just as theo-
retical predicates fall into certain categories, morally relevant 
predicates also appear to fall into certain categories, such as 
those cited by Aristotle. It is common in contemporary meta-
ethics to talk about actions which are relevantly similar morally, 
but what sorts of things are morally relevant are never classi-
fied. In many cases, this is a reflection of the supposition 
that, being based on language, there are an indefinite number of 
categories. But where Aristotle diverges from such category 
schemes lies in just this supposition. There are, for him, a 
definite number of mutually exclusive theoretical categories. 
By extending this, we may see practical categories as marking 
off different kinds of morally relevant predicates. The maxim of 
a virtuous action, which lies in the mean, will fall under some 
though perhaps not all of these categories; it will be a certain 
kind of action, done at a certain time, etc. Thus the general 
character of virtue is to be good in each of the categories, 
rather than to share in a form of the good. And this is exactly 
what Aristotle does say about virtue. 
But something which exists must fall under one or more of 
the theoretical categories and empirical objects typically fall 
under all or most of them. And actions and passions, the subject 
matter of practical philosophy, exist. Thus the claim that 
"good" has as many senses as "being" may mean that, for example, 
since the substance and qualities of an action "are" in different 
senses, the senses in which they "are good" must also be 
different. This suggests that there are no practical categories 
as supposed; rather practical judgments employ theoretical 
categories if at all. But the differences between practical and 
theoretical judgments must be kept in mind. One produces 
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knowledge of objects, while the other leads to action. Only 
an action can be the proper conclusion of a practical syllogism. 
However, it is not the existing action which is of practical 
significance but the state of character from which it springs; 
this provides the moral principle. And it is to this basis of 
action that practical categories pertain. After all, virtuous 
and vicious men may often perform the same actions. This points 
out the dual perspectives of all actions. From the practical 
perspective, there are categories with which virtuous action must 
be in accordance and which practical judgments must presuppose; 
just as knowledge presupposes employment of theoretical categories. 
And they are categories in the sense of being the highest-order 
predicates of practical judgment. Actions then can fall under 
theoretical categories from the perspective of knowledge and 
under distinctive practical categories from the perspective of 
virtue. This point provides a second need for categories. 
As mentioned, one difficulty facing the different inter-
pretations of the mean is their ability to handle the two models 
of moral actions. For some actions, the character of their 
performance is just not morally relevant; the only thing of 
importance is the kind of action that they are. What I want to 
suggest then is that a list of Aristotelian practical categories 
must include a category of substance, i.e. kind of action. And 
as the category of substance gives the primary sense of being, 
the category of moral substance plays a key role for the good. 
For actions good or bad in the category of substance without 
qualification, such as murder or not lying, the other categories 
need not be consulted. But for other actions, their goodness 
depends on the assessment of their predicates within the other 
categories. This provides an adequate explanation of the two 
classes of actions, without abandoning the categorical inter-
pretation; the mean thus interpreted pertains to both. It should 
also handle the problems of demarcating the two classes of 
action and dealing with apparent counter-examples within the 
second class. Here is also a framework for unifying deonto-
logical and teleological theories. Thus Aristotle might be 
seen as coming close to Kant, except that no rule is given for 
determining goodness within the category of substance. 
How is a categorial analysis of the virtues as a mean 
given? Facing danger is a kind of action which is not good or 
bad without qualification and which thus belongs to the class 
of actions susceptible to the three-part model. Here an 
essential category is that of time. To be rash means always to 
meet any danger and to be a coward means always to avoid any 
danger; while to be courageous means to face or avoid dangers 
at the proper time. The differences between this virtue and 
its correlative vices, as states of character, lie in this: 
the vices involve not the use of judgment about the propriety 
of the time, as virtue does, but the use of inflexible rules of 
action. For the vices, there are no categories; one can not 
propose to act at the wrong time, etc. What is significant is 
that the good man judges such cases in each of the categories. 
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while the bad man can only be interpreted as not employing 
judgments (or categories) at all but some general inflexible 
mode of conduct. It is in this sense that vice is an extreme. 
And the virtues and vices are discontinuous, since the differences 
between intermediate and its extremes are not here a matter of 
degree. But the vices do confirm the categorial analysis in 
that they become extremes in one or more of the practical 
categories. 
For Aristotle, practical reason and judgment spring from 
and are conditioned by the agent's character. Virtue is not a 
matter of judgment, although judgment is a matter of virtue. 
Thus the mean, and the practical categories, do not provide 
rules for determining the virtues, although they are employed 
implicitly in that determination. They provide then general 
characteristics of what practical reason judges to be virtuous. J 
And the proper application of the mean as a principle both 
requires experience and depends on a virtuous character. Thus 
what appears to be a problem, how propriety within each of the 
categories is determined, does not become a problem for Aristotle. 
This itself must be a matter of practical judgment based on a 
virtuous character. And this reinforces our reading of the 
Nichomachean Ethics above. 
The University of Kansas 
NOTES 
1. Aristotle, Politics, 1287b 44ff; Nichomachean Ethics, 1132a 
20ff are examples. 
2. "But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; 
for some have names that already imply badness." Aristotle, 
Nichomachean Ethics, 1107a 8-10. 
3. This is consistent with and casts light on the passage cited 
on page 
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TUE S-PREMISE 
S. Ron Oliver 
It is the intention herein to explicate and deal with certain 
aspects of scientific explanation. In particular, this is to be 
done with critical reference to material presented by Richard Cole 
in Wisdom. In keeping with this secondary goal, and due to the 
natural limits of time and space it will not be possible to pro-
vide a complete, cohesive theory of knowledge, though such is 
usually fundamental to the development of a theory of scientific 
explanation. Effort will be made, however, to provide sufficient 
guidelines of the underlying theory as to render the theory of 
explanation intelligible.1 
I. The Standard Model of Explanation 
The particular feature with which we are concerned is Cole's 
analysis of explanation, of which the account of Alethea and her 
encounter with the watch is the prototype. In doing science we 
observe a certain (simple or complex) phenomenon. We are motivated 
through an element of curiosity (or whatever) to "explain" that 
phenomenon. Of course, there are some events which do not so 
motivate us. They are, in some sense, primitive. We accept them 
at face value (as they are presented to us) as not being in need 
of explanation. The business of doing explanation enters when 
we are confronted with phenomena which we do not take as primitive. 
A study of such phenomena ensues which involves various and 
sundry observations and actions. The goal of this study is to 
obtain (discover) a set or network of elements which are themselves 
primitives, or combinations of primitives, and when taken as a 
related whole have the force of eliminating our perplexity about 
the event under scrutiny. That is, we proceed to provide a causal 
(to use the term loosely) pattern of primitive observations which, 
if properly related in a logical manner, explain the phenomenon 
which motivated our study. And the essence of this explanation is 
the elimination of curiosity or motivation to explain. 
In general, the resultant explanation will refer to a rather 
restricted set of impressions (real-world phenomenon). At first 
we might only apply it to those specific events which we have 
observed during the construction of our explanation. We then may 
become more generous and apply our analysis to all events like 
those we have dealt with. Whatever the interpretation set of our 
explanation, the form of it might be represented thus: 
